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DAVID TODD*

Common Resources, Private

Rights and Liabilities:
A Case Study on Texas
Groundwater Law
ABSTRACT
In light of recent efforts to provide market solutions to environmental problems, this paperoffers Texas groundwaterlaw, use, and
environmental effects as an example of the difficulties in defining,
contracting,and enforcingprivate rights in common-pool resources.
The paper first discusses the link from various environmental impacts, including drawdown, mining, saltwater intrusion, baseflow
reduction, and land surface subsidence, to excessive groundwater
use (Section 2). Excessive groundwater use is in turn attributed to
the failure of private agreements to coordinate well sites and flow
rates, to reduce groundwater demand, and to compensate any of
those harmed by withdrawals. Sections 3-5 examine the private,
judicial,and statutoryfactorsthat inhibit coordinationordiscourage
agreements among private groundwater rights holders. Last, the
paper suggests ways that Texas groundwater law can give lines of
inquiry into other privately basedforms of environmental regulation,
such as that offered under the Clean Air Act (Section 7).

1. INTRODUCTION
The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act illustrates recent efforts
to use economic analysis and market solutions to treat environmental
problems.' While these efforts promise flexible and efficient answers to
pressing pollution and natural resource problems, they may create a raft
of new and difficult questions. The troubled experience of Texas in controlling groundwater use and limiting related environmental damage by
relying on private self-help and contract, and eschewing tort and regulatory solutions through the courts and legislature, may be instructive.
Overuse of Texas groundwater and related environmental harm shows
the difficulty of efficiently and equitably defining, allocating and pro*Staff attorney, Texas Air Control Board, Emory University School of Law, ID. '91, Rice
University School of Engineering, M.S.'84, Princeton University, A.B.'82, cum laude
1. Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 101 (1990).
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tecting rights to a common, fluid resource through market mechanisms
without guidance from publicly agreed and enforced rules.
2. GROUNDWATER USE AND EFFECTS
2.1 Groundwater Use
Groundwater is water held underground in clay, sand, gravel, and other
porous strata. It is a heavily used resource in Texas, providing 9.7 million
gallons per day, or 61 percent of the total state water supply in 1980.2
Moreover, groundwater use is expected to increase. State water planners
have predicted a 47.9 percent increase in total state water demand from
1975 to 2030.' Much of the increase can be reasonably expected to come
from groundwater sources: while only 770 wells were drilled in the state
in 1962, 12,554 new wells were registered during 1989.'
2.2 Environmental Effects of Groundwater Use
The extensive use of groundwater in Texas has caused a series of
environmental problems in various parts of the state, including water
level drawdown, aquifer mining, saltwater intrusion, stream bdiseflow
reduction, and land surface subsidence. The following examples are offered as illustrations of the scope, severity and widespread nature of these
effects.
2.2.1 Environmental Effects-Drawdown
As groundwater is pumped, the water table, or the top edge of the
saturated media, will typically decline. If pumpage greatly exceeds recharge (flow into the aquifer), drawdown can be significant.
Extensive drawdown has been measured in the Houston-Galveston
area. From 1943 to 1977, water levels declined as much as 250 feet in
wells completed in the Chicot aquifer, and as much as 300 feet in wells
drawing from the Evangeline aquifer.' Drawdown at this scale is a concern
for two reasons: first, lift costs increase, and second, if the water table
2. D. Moody, J. Fischer, E. Chase, National Water Summary 1984-Hydrologic Events, Selected
Water-Quality Trends and Groundwater Resources 397 (United States Geological Survey WaterSupply Paper 2275, 1985).
3. Library of Congress, CongressionalResearch Service, State and National Water Use Trends
to the year 2000: A Report 188 (Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, no. 96-12,
1980).
4. Telephone interview with Gerald Adair, Texas Water Development Board, Groundwater Department, State Well Numbering and Driller Logs Section (March 19, 1990).
5. R. Gabrysch, Ground-water Withdrawals and Land-Surface Subsidence in the Houston-Galveston Region, Texas, 1906-80 66 (United States Geologic Survey Open-File Report 82-571, 1982).
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Figure 1: Drawdown

drops below the screened depth of the well, the well may have to be
reworked or even abandoned and replaced.'
2.2.2 Environmental Effects--Mining
Aquifer mining refers to the withdrawal of groundwater from confined
aquifers, aquifers with minimal recharge rates, resulting in aquifer storage
decreases. Two examples might be offered: mining for agricultural purposes in the High Plains, and for municipal use in the El Paso area. In
both cases, groundwater miners must face continually higher lift costs as
water levels decline, and ultimately, must turn to alternative surface water
sources, reuse schemes, conservation plans, or abandonment of the waterintensive use (as happened in the Pecos valley during the 1950s).
Castro and Parmer counties are typical of High Plains farming areas
which face problems of aquifer overdraft. Of 1,144 operating farms, 931
relied on irrigation to produce crops, with 915 principally using groundwater and 822 exclusively using groundwater.7 During the 1975-83 period, farmers in the two counties withdrew 11,269,000 acre-feet of water,

6. Lift costs are estimated to increase by $0.00125 per 1,000 gallons pumped per foot of lift.
Telephone interview with Joseph (Bud) Holzschuh, Harris Galveston Coastal Subsidence District,
Groundwater Hydrology division (March 7, 1990). Based on Houston's 1978 use rates, the cost to
the City would exceed $103,000 per year per foot of drawdown. Gabrysch, supra note 5 at 65.
Drawdown in local wells varied but ran as high as seven feet per year in 1978. Id. at 64. Lift costs
can be particularly significant for agricultural users who do not have chlorination, tank and pipe
costs to consider, In a suit for conversion, the plaintiff estimated that one fifth of the groundwater
value consisted of lift costs. Gifford v. Howell, No. 6996, slip op. at 2 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso
Oct. 15, 1980).
7. United States Bureau of the Census, Data User Services Division, 1982 Census of Agriculture
County Data, CD-ROM format (1990).
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Figure 2: Mining
reducing storage by 5,158,000 acre-feet, representing a 19.6 percent loss
in storage for the Ogallala aquifer within those counties.'
El Paso is also heavily dependent on groundwater supplies, but in this
case principally for municipal uses. Wells completed in the Hueco bolson
and the Rio Grande alluvium produced 164,354 acre-feet in 1980, compared to only 20,057 acre-feet drawn from surface sources. 9 Of this
groundwater use, most is mined, that is, drawn from storage. For example, the groundwater withdrawals from the Hueco exceeded 1980 recharge by a factor of 23.'0 Mining at these rates has caused significant
storage declines in the region's aquifers: declines for the 1906-80 period
are now estimated at 23 percent."
2.2.3 Environmental Effects-Saltwater Intrusion
Saltwater intrusion can result as fresh groundwater is drawn down and
saline water flows in to replace it. As fresh water supplies are contaminated, new wells must be drilled, coastal injection wells installed, and/
or the brackish groundwater treated with costly osmosis or catalysis methods.
Kingsville, Texas, to the southwest of Corpus Christi, and about 35
miles from the Gulf coast, offers an example. With pumpage occurring
at some 275 local wells, water levels in the Evangeline aquifer underlying
8. G. Mackey, Comparison of Irrigation Pumpage and Change in Water Storage of the High
PlainsAquifer in Castro and ParmerCounties, Texas, 1975-83 22,34,38,41 (United States Geologic
Survey Water-Resources Investigations Report 87-4032, 1987).
9. D. White, Summary of Hydrologic Information inthe El Paso, Texas, Area with Emphasis on
Groundwater Studies, 1903-80 1,72 (United States Geologic Survey Open-File Report 83-775, 1983).
10. Id. at 7, 71
11. Id. at 1. 72.
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Kingsville have dropped as much as 219 feet.' 2 As a result, saline water
from deeper and coastward aquifers has migrated in and caused salinities
in the wells to rise. Readings of 4,485 mg/L total dissolved solids (TDS),
in the range of moderately saline water, have been made in Kingsville
area wells.

3 4

'

2.2.4 Environmental Effects-Stream Baseflow Reduction
. Surface streams can include artesian springflow from underlying aquifers. However, if the aquifers are pumped in excess of their recharge

rates, the springflow, or stream baseflow, can be reduced. Pumpage by
upland or upriver well owners can seriously interfere with use by those
who hold rights to downstream surface water flows.

This has occurred in the area around San Antonio, Texas. From 1934
to 1984, well pumpage in the San Antonio portion of the Edwards aquifer
increased from 101,900 acre-feet per year to 529,800 acre-feet per year. 6
By 1984, springflow was estimated at 175,575 acre-feet, less than the
12. P. Rettman, Water Levels and Salinities of Water within the Evangeline Aquifer in an area
southwest of Corpus Christi, Texas 3, 9 (United States Geologic Survey Open-File Report 82-174,
1983).
13. Id. at 25. To put these readings in perspective: ocean water averages 35,000 mg/L TDS,
while drinking water maximum limits are commonly set at 1,000 mg/L TDS.
14. R. Reeves, G. Ozuna, Compilation of Hydrologic Data for the Edwards Aquifer, San Antonio
Area, Texas, 1983-84, with 1934-84 Summary 10 (Edwards Underground Water District, Bulletin
43-44, prepared in cooperation with the United States Geologic Survey and the Texas Department
of Water Resources, 1986).
15. V. Chow, Handbook of Applied Hydrology 2-3 (McGraw-Hill 1964).
16. G. Nalley, P. Rettman, Compilation of Hydrologic Data for the EdwardsAquifer, San Antonio,
Texas with 1934-87 Summary 50,51 (Edwards Underground Water District, Bulletin 47, prepared
in cooperation with the United States Geologic Survey and the Texas Department of Water Resources,
1988).
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Figure 4: Baseflow Reduction
recharge rate of 197,900 acre-feet, and significantly less than historic
springflows of over 300,000 acre-feet per year. 7 Since springflow makes
up a large portion of streamflow (62 percent of streamflow in 1983), law
suits have ensued, pitting well owners against downstream holders of
surface water rights.'" Recently, governmental entities and environmental
groups have also charged that pumpage has decreased flow to Comal
Springs and other artesian pools and thus threatened populations of rare
pupfish, darters, and salamanders.'"
2.2.5 Environmental Effects--Land Surface Subsidence
As groundwater is pumped and withdrawn from the pore spaces of
aquifer clays, sands, and other media, these spaces often collapse. When
they collapse, overlying strata, and ultimately the land surface as well,
drop. Land surface subsidence in coastal areas can cause inundation, and
in inland regions, it can damage building and road foundations. In extremely flat areas such as the Texas Gulf Coast plain, where slopes of
only one foot per mile are common, subsidence can reverse the slopes
of streams and so interfere with drainage.
The Houston-Galveston area has witnessed extensive subsidence. By
1974, groundwater withdrawals had neared 600,000 acre-feet per year.2'
Related subsidence of 0.5 to 8.5 feet had by then affected a 4,700-square
mile area." Subsidence as great as 10 feet has been recorded in isolated
areas over the 1906-78 period.22
17. Id. at 51.
18. Id. at 51, 184-235.
19. Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority v. City of Lytel, No. 89-281 (22d Jud. Dist., Tex. filed
1989).
20. Gabrysch, supra note 5, at 65.
21. R. Gabrysch, C. Bonnet, Land-Surface Subsidence in the Houston-GalvestonRegion, Texas
(Texas Water Development Board Report no. 188, 1975).
22. Gabrysch, supra note 5 at 66.
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Figure 5: Land Surface Subsidence
3. NORMS AND GROUNDWATER USE
It is doubtful that groundwater pumpers are unusually irrational or
perverse. Judicial and statutory regimes aside, why do well owners continue to pursue heavy groundwater use, despite attendant problems such
as drawdown, mining, salinization, baseflow reduction, and subsidence?
Why do pumpers appear to ignore these problems and fail to take steps
to reduce the damage or compensate those harmed? Why have efficient
well supply schemes, such as coordinated spacing arrangements, not been
more widely adopted? Why have more efficient water use policies and
conservation devices not been employed? Failing these measures, why
haven't those responsible for the harm faced injunctions or damage judgments?
The nonlegal, norms-based answer to some of these questions may
simply be that the problems just are not severe enough to merit concern
or response. However, the difficulties regarding groundwater use and
related environmental effects seem quite severe and widespread. It is
more likely that the problems and feasible solutions are seen, but cannot
be agreed upon. Mitigation of these harms would require at least three
types of agreements: 1) deals to coordinate supply well sites and flow
rates, 2) bargains to collectively reduce groundwater demand in agricultural, municipal, and industrial applications, and 3) agreements to allocate
costs and compensate for harms.
A number of nonlegal factors reduce the likelihood that voluntary
agreements will be initially sought, then negotiated, and finally enforced
and obeyed. The following section discusses plausible factors in the non
legal realm, including ignorance, transaction costs, the prisoner's dilemma, the limits of self-help, the tragedy of the commons, the effects
of racing, and the unfeasibility of most options. Section 4 considers some
of the legal rules of ownership and liability developed by the courts which
may bear on the existence and strength of agreements. Section 5 discusses
statutory supervision, support and replacement of such agreements.
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3.1 Ignorance and Initiating Agreements
For many years, there was little understanding of groundwater sources,
quantities, and behavior. Pumpers were unaware of the effects of groundwater use and unlikely to consider, much less enter in on agreements to
coordinate their use with affected parties. An early British opinion on
groundwater rights, Acton v. Blunder, stated, "no man can tell what
changes these underground sources have undergone in the progress of
time.'23 An American court echoed, "the laws of its existence and progress . . . cannot be known or regulated." 24 Another nineteenth century
United States decision laments, "the existence, origin, movement and
course of such waters, and the causes which govern and direct their
movements, .... are secret, occult, and concealed ... 25
As time has passed, understanding of groundwater dynamics has improved greatly, and ignorance has become less of an excuse for groundwater abuse. Still, though, knowledge is somewhat restricted to theoretical
generalities and aggregate supply and use figures. Unfortunately, key
factors in groundwater availability and flow often turn on site-specific
and widely varying parameters such as storativity and conductivity. Storativity is a function of the pore space volume in an aquifer and a good
indicator of the amount of water held in the aquifer, and can vary by a
factor of close to 3,000.26 Similarly, hydraulic conductivity, an expression
of the ease with which water will flow through an aquifer, can fluctuate
by a factor of over 5,000,000.27 Often, monitoring wells do not exist,
pump tests have not been run, and results have not been reported, compiled and published to make such groundwater data available. In that
sense, ignorance may remain a good alibi.
3.2 Transaction Costs and Negotiating Agreements
Knowledge about groundwater may have improved in recent years, but
it remains costly. In fact, relative to the immediately apparent, somewhat
small benefits of coordinated well spacing, knowledge and other transaction costs involved in coordinating may seem very high. Transaction
costs may appear to be so high as to foreclose any bargaining.
If one assumes that an aquifer is isotropic and homogeneous, there is
no advantage to cooperation among pumpers. The effect of additional
wells is merely cumulative. Neglecting near-well effects, coordinated sets
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Acton v. Blunder, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1233 (Ex. 1843).
Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 541, 52 Am. Dec. 352 (1850).
Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861).
Chow, supra note 15, at 4-21.
P. Bedient, W. Huber, Hydrology and Floodplain Analysis 496 (Addison Wesley 1988).
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of wells will not reduce aggregate aquifer drawdown, saline inflow, or
subsidence." However, most aquifers are uneven. Some sections have

highly porous sands storing vast amounts of water, while other parts have
dense media with low storage values. Some sections are made up of
relatively rigid gravels that are not vulnerable to subsiding, while other

parts may have clays which shrink badly and settle after dewatering.
Some portions of the aquifer may have high conductivity, allowing great
flow through the stratum, while other sections are highly impermeable.
28. Assuming a perfectly homogeneous, isotropic aquifer, it can be shown that drawdown, saline
inflow, and subsidence are purely cumulative effects. That is, the marginal effect of each added well
is the same as that due to the first well. A set of n wells pumping x gallons per day will have the
same aggregate effect as a single well pumping nx gallons per day. Consider the following equations:
Drawdown in an unconfined aquifer [Bedient & Huber, supra note 27, at 517; W. Viessman, Jr.,
T. Harbaugh, J. Knapp, Introduction to Hydrology 255 (Intext Educational Publishers 1972); Chow,
supra note 15, at 13-17] can be found using the equation given below. Please note that Q1 is just a
first order term.
n
d=

Qi
i = 1IrK""

log,

2*7r*K*bloj

F

Where:
d = drawdown (feet)
i= number of wells
K = permeability (gallons/day/square foot)
Q = pump flow (gallons per minute
ro = radius of no influence (typically 500-1000 feet)
r2= radius of pumping well to monitoring well
For drawdown in a confined aquifer, the following equation can be used (Bedient & Huber, supra
note 27, at 516; Viessman, et al., at 255; Chow, supra note 15, at 13-16). Again, note that Qi is
only a first order term.
n
d

=

QiK
log,
i=I2**K*b

ItI

Where:
b = aquifer thickness (feet)
Saline intrusion can be calculated from drawdown through the following equation (Viessman, at
262; Chow, supra note 15, at 13-48). Note that saline inflow varies directly and on a first order
basis with drawdown, and hence with well flow.
z = 40 * d
(Ghyben-Herzberg)
Where:
z = saltwater head (feet)
Subsidence can be estimated on the basis of this equation (Gabrysch, supra note 5, at 64).
Subsidence varies proportionately, in a first order relationship with drawdown and well flow.

s

=

k*c*d

Where:
s = land surface subsidence (feet)
k = specific-unit compaction (/foot)
c = dewatered clay thickness (feet)
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In other words, some parts of an aquifer, or, to an extent, any fluidbearing reservoir, are much more conducive to safe and efficient development than other parts.29
However, the logically recognized benefits of cooperation are difficult
to demonstrate until after time consuming tests of the aquifer. At the
start, the up-front transaction costs of cooperation are painfully apparent.
The costs include technical expenses such as well monitoring and aquifer
computer modeling. Legal costs for negotiating and drawing contracts
for surface canal and tank easements and for allocation of yield shares
may also arise. Many pumpers may consider that a deal cannot be worth
these transaction costs.
3.3 The Prisoner's Dilemma and Complying with Agreements
If a bargain can be reached for coordinating or reducing pumpage, a
pumper faces a dilemma about complying with the deal he has made. He
confronts what might be called a prisoner's dilemma.
A prisoner's dilemma typically has three features: 3'
1. The game is not zero-sum. If both individuals cooperate (A,
in the matrix immediately below), they both do better, in absolute
(though not inrelative) terms, than if both defect (D). Total profits
are greater if both cooperate.
2. Defecting alone (B) is best; cooperating together (A) is second
best; defecting together (D) is next best; cooperating alone (C) is
worst.
3. The joint reward for both cooperating (A) is more than the total
gain for one individual cooperating and the second defecting (C).
The dilemma can be shown by the following table:
Own behavior
COOPERATE
DEFECT
Where:

Other's behavior
COOPERATE
A
B

DEFECT
C
D

1. A > B AND D > C
2. A > C AND B > D
3. (Aown + Aother) > ANY OTHER PAIR SUM
Table 1: The Prisoner's Dilemma

29. J. Weaver, Unitization ofOil and Gas Fields in Texas: A Study of Legislative, Administrative,
and Judicial Policies (Resources for the Future, 1986).
30. P. Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the Evolutionof Cooperation, 93 Yale L.J. 1147,
1151, fn.16 (May 1984) (book review).
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In turn, the dilemma can be used to frame the options facing one
pumper considering whether to cooperate with a second pumper.
The benefits of defection (B and C) are tempting: a prompt supply of
water at an individually convenient flow rate and location can be developed immediately. The risks of defection are quite slight. Monitoring
compliance with a well pumpage scheme would be difficult, given the
great number, wide spacing and private location of wells. Since getting
caught defecting is difficult, freeloading on the cooperator(s) in the near
term is certainly attractive. Even if one is caught, a defector can probably
extort exorbitant concessions to prevent wholesale defection from the
delicate network of contracts among remaining cooperators.
Conversely, the benefits of cooperation are difficult to show (A seems
only slightly better than D, and even less clearly better than B or C). As
discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2, the benefits of a coordinated pumping
scheme rely on site-specific aspects of an aquifer and on data-intensive
monitoring of pump flow rates, well sites and screen depths. Furthermore,
the carefully calculated benefits may be slow to appear. Also, the benefits
of cooperation will only be evident in comparison with the lone-ranger
pumping scheme which the contracting pumpers have supposedly abandoned. Thus, to a degree the benefits of cooperation must be taken on
faith, particularly in the early stages. It should not be surprising if a
pumper feels perplexed and torn by a choice between defecting and
cooperating.
3.4 Self-help and Enforcing Agreements
If a pumper suspects that his neighbor is not complying with a supply
or use agreement, he has few effective ways to enforce that agreement
(please note that nonpumpers, such as those who hold surface rights to
artesian spring water, have even fewer self-help options). First, it is
difficult to identify who is defecting from the agreement and causing
water levels to drop or land to subside. It is unclear which neighbor he
should seek to persuade or coerce. In cases where norms have been
effective, tracking the evildoer is easier. For example, in Ellickson's
article, Of Coase and Cattle, one could look to a roving cow's brand and
know who was responsible for breaking the grazing agreements."
Second, even if a pumper knew who the culprit was, he would have
limited means of forcing his cooperation. Gossip might be one option,
but would probably be limited in its effectiveness by two factors. First,
the installation of wells and pumps is costly, and their operation quite
deliberate. Most well owners would probably have already considered
31. R. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute-Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County,
38 Stan. L. Rev. 623, 676 (1986).
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and dismissed the possible gossip and criticismh that might result from
harmful use of the aquifer. Second, gossip is most effective in small,
homogeneous, tightly bound communities, such as the whale-hunting
fleets of the nineteenth century. 2 In the large, diverse, and often urban
communities where many groundwater conflicts arise, gossip would probably have little impact.
Even if a pumper decided to be more aggressive, and turned to fight
back, an eye-for-an-eye, he might only hurt himself. His goal would be
to pump enough to hurt his deviant neighbor. However, to do this, he
would have to increase the number and size of his wells and the power
and flow rate of his pumps. The cost could be substantial. And then, as
he turned on the pumps, his own wells would be the first hurt, and the
most substantially hurt.33 For the minimal impact on the defector, and
the sizable harm to the cooperator, self-help is not a promising way of
enforcing groundwater agreements against parties.
3.5 The Tragedy of the Commons and Outsiders to Agreements
The difficulties of negotiating a cooperative agreement with another
pumper and subsequently complying with that agreement are compounded
if other, third-party pumpers are considered. The individual harms of
shunning agreements or subsequently defecting from agreements will
seem small relative to the cumulative aquifer effect and the pumper's
foregone wellwater.
Here, the pumper may face a situation similar to the paradigm posed
in Garrett Hardin's article, The Tragedy of the Commons. 4 Hardin laid
out the choices facing a rational herdsman seeking to graze additional
stock on a single, commonly held pasture. Considering his options, the
herdsman would ask himself, "what is the utility to me of adding one
more animal to my herd?" Recognizing that he garnered all the profit
from selling the animal and suffered only a pro rata loss in his incremental
harm to the pasture, he would rationally add another (and another) animal
to his grazing herd.
In our example, the commons consists of a relatively few aquifers,
just seven principal reservoirs and sixteen minor ones within the state. 3
The animals might be seen as water supply wells in this case, of which
there are over 369,000 registered in Texas.3 6 The herdsman might be
32. R. Ellickson, A Hypothesisof Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidencefrom the Whaling Industry,
I J. Law, Econ., and Org. 83, 85 (1989).
33. The elegant solutions of killing the trespassing cow or the wrongly claimed whale are not
available here as means of effective self-help and revenge. It is hard to take revenge on missing
water.
34. G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243-48 (1968).
35. Moody, et al., supra note 2, at 397.
36. Adair, supra note 4.
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characterized as an agricultural well owner, since about 81 percent of
Texas groundwater was withdrawn for irrigation in 1986." 7 Extrapolating
from well (7,923 wells registered in 1979) and farm statistics (1,149
irrigated farms in 1978) for Castro and Parmer counties, we might expect
as many 53,000 well owners in Texas.3 39 Although this is a crude estimate, it should show that there are indeed many pumpers sharing use
of only a few aquifers. There are certainly enough pumpers and a limited
enough mutually held resource to create the tragedy of the commons that
Hardin discussed.
For example, as each pumper approaches the decision whether to pump
an extra gallon or even whether to sink another well, he will likely
recognize that he gains all of the additional water produced yet individually is directly responsible for only a small portion (C) of the total harm
to the aquifer. The cumulative harm (D) to the aquifer will not be apparent
to him, and he will proceed to pump more (B rather than A). His situation
might be depicted below:
TMC

p

D

IMC

............

... .. .. .. ..
...

0
Where:

A

B

Q/tn

TMC = Total marginal cost (sum of marginal
costs imposed by all pumpers)
IMC = Individual marginal cost (includes
only the individual's separate
drilling, pumpage, and storage
costs, in addition to the pro-rata
harm to the aquifer)
MR = Marginal revenue recognized
Figure 6: The Tragedy of the Commons

37. Telephone interview with Norman Allfred, Texas Water Development Board, Water Use and
Projections office (March 23, 1990).
38. Mackey, supra note 8, at 8.
39. United States Bureau of the Census.
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3.6 Racing and Conditions after the Agreement
The difficulty of reaching and enforcing agreements to control groundwater use rises as the effects of time are considered. Ideally, when a well
owner uses water from an aquifer today, he should weigh the opportunity
cost of not having that water available tomorrow. Although the opportunity cost would be discounted by the current interest rate or by other
alternative investment returns, this cost would be quite significant. The
opportunity cost of future use foregone would act as a strong check on
today's use, as a limit on current groundwater pumpage. A pumper might
analyze his situation as follows, consider his opportunity cost, and decide
to pump at a reduced rate of A, not B: °
P

TMC

MFC

D

*.

0
Where:

A

B

Q/tn

D = Demand
MFC = Marginal factor cost, exclusive of
opportunity cost
TMC = Total marginal cost, inclusive of
opportunity cost
Figure 7: Racing

However, if the pumper shares his groundwater supply with others,
the scenario is quite different. In that case, he can no longer be sure that
unused groundwater will remain for his use tomorrow: another pumper
may have already pumped it. His opportunity cost quickly becomes uncertain, and more so as the number of competing pumpers grows and the
size of the aquifer diminishes. Other, more general factors may also reduce
the opportunity cost: high interest rates and dubious survival of the
groundwater-dependent business may contribute. 4 ' Oltimately, there may
40. A. Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources,
18 UCLA L. Rev. 855, 858 (1971).
41. It is interesting to note that just this combination of factors (double-digit interest rates and
record farm bankruptcies) confronted farmers in the early 1980s. However, racing did not occur in
Parmer and Castro counties. In fact, agricultural groundwater consumption fell by 29 percent from
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remain little reason to forestall today's pumping to allow future withdrawals. The race begins!
3.7 Options outside Groundwater Use and Agreements
Viable alternatives to groundwater use might relieve the pressure to
compete with individual, group, and future pumpers. Possible options
include: 1) reducing consumption needs through conservation measures,
2) restoring the quantity and quality of groundwater to allow future use,
and 3) turning to surface sources. Each, however, has significant costs
which make these options unattractive.
3.6.1 Conservation
For agricultural users, water conservation can be expensive. Measures
may include lining canals and tanks with concrete, plastic or impermeable
clays, grading and levying cropfields to a precisely even and bounded
level, using more pesticides (for example, flooding is currently used to
reduce weeds in rice fields), or even switching to less profitable dry-land
crops (for instance, changing from sugar beets to winter wheat).4 2
For municipal users, conservation can be equally unattractive. Residential consumers are loath to change their lifestyle and resist the initial
investment in more water-efficient devices. Also, mission-oriented public
works agencies have often slighted conservation efforts in favor of supply
increases, which tend to enhance consumer demand and agency budget
and staffing.43 In short, conservation is an option with high real or imagined costs and often has not been pursued.
3.6.2 Aquifer Maintenance and Restoration
Some commentators have argued for protecting aquifers from excessive
demand by enhancing supply, that is, by returning water to the aquifers.
However, the cost of treating the water, drilling injection wells, and
1980 to 1983. Mackey, supra note 8, at 41,
It is difficult to say why this happened. Perhaps short-term racing is uncommon due to fixed longterm investments in land and wells. Or, maybe farmers were so over leveraged that their businesses
collapsed before a race could begin. Also, it may be that secular trends are responsible for the failure
of a race to occur, i.e., an increase in the cost of electricity for pumpage or more common use of
low-loss irrigation methods, such as drip or bubble techniques.
Conceivably, though, it is partly due to the great size of the governing District. Castro and Parmer
counties are within the 13-county, 5,000,000-acre territory of the High Plains Underground Water
Conservation District. As discussed in Section 4.3, the larger the size of a District's jurisdiction,
the more likely that it will be successful in controlling groundwater abuse.
42. Id. at 29.
43. M Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and its DisappearingWater (Viking Press,
1986); E. Kolbert, The Drink of Millions, N. Y. Times, March 4, 1990, Magazine, at 32.
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constructing rapid infiltration ponds has been discouraging." Also, the
well injection flow rates and infiltration velocities are slowed by clogging,
scaling, bacterial growth, and conductivity limits inherent to the aquifer.45
Finally, many aquifers settle after production, lose their former storage
capacity, and cannot be recharged at any rate. Due to the high costs,
slow rate, and reduced capacity, aquifer maintenance and restoration
programs have not been widely adopted.
3.6.3 Surface Water Development

For many Texas groundwater users, turning to surface water for supplies
would be difficult. First, many of the heavy withdrawals are in dry sections
of the state where there may simply be no nearby lake or stream.' Second,

surface water rights may well have already been assigned to riparian and/

or senior users."7 Third, it is unlikely that stream flow would exceed water
rights; typically, the converse is true. Fourth, even if surface water were
physically and legally available, the cost and delay of permitting and

building a reservoir, canal, pump, and treatment system could easily be
prohibitive." In fact, recently, the cost of reservoirs has risen still further
for municipalities and farmers due to decreases in cost-sharing by the
Army Corps of Engineers and the Soil Conservation Service. Finally,
some water users fear the monopolistic pricing and political control that
a surface water supplier may be able to exert.49
4. TEXAS CASE LAW ON GROUNDWATER
Texas common law increases the difficulties of initiating, negotiating,
complying with and enforcing groundwater agreements, and so acts to
44. Chow, supra note 15, at 13-42.
45. Hydraulic conductivity values for silts and clays in the Houston subsurface may range from
0.26 to as low as 0.00066 feet/day. Considering that local producing wells draw from strata as deep
as 1,000 feet, natural (unpressurized) infiltration rates may create long lags in restoring an aquifer:
in this case, II to 4,100 years. Bedient & Huber, supra note 27, at 496.
46. Moody, et al., supra note 2, at 401.
47. In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the Guadalupe
River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438,442 (Tex. 1982).
48. A 1977 study estimated that groundwater cost the City of Houston 6¢ per 1,000 gallons at
the wellhead. Treated (groundwater typically does not require filtration or sedimentation, as does
surface water) surface water at a major distribution line cost 20.3o per 1,000 gallons, 236 percent
more. By using groundwater rather than surface water, Houston saved $8,164,000 per year at 1974
consumption rates. J. Teutsch, Subsidence in the Houston-Galveston Region: A Compiehensive
Analysis 7 (December 1977) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Rice University (Houston)).
49. The City of Bellaire, a small municipality located wholly within Houston, has continually
lobbied the Texas Legislature during recent years to limit the power of the Harris-Galveston Coastal
Subsidence District to restrict pumpage by Bellaire. Bellaire has been concerned that reductions in
groundwater supplies will force them to buy surface water from the City of Houston at confiscatory
prices or with extensive concessions in political control.
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worsen groundwater use problems such as drawdown, mining, salination,
baseflow reduction, and land subsidence. Texas groundwater law only
endorses ownership based on capture and only recognizes liability in
restricted subsidence cases. With such limited ownership and liability,
groundwater users have similarly limited incentive and compulsion to
contract for efficient and environmentally safe pumpage."
4.1 Texas Rule of Groundwater Ownership
Texas courts employ the English rule of absolute ownership of groundwater, which regards groundwater to be "the absolute property of the
owner of the freehold, like the rocks, soil and minerals that compose it,
so that he is free to withdraw it at will and do with it as he pleases. ...
This doctrine amounts to a rule of capture or first possession, since
groundwater is not effectively owned until pumped or "captured." 5 3

50. The law particularly fails in forcing groundwater users to bargain with smaller pumpers and
nonpumpers, who have minimal means of retaliating under the non legal regime.
One commentator pointed out that the Houston ruling leaves ineffective self-help as the sole
remedy for small well operators, e.g., "construction of a well powerful enough to pull water from
the railroad's well, a prohibitively expensive remedy for one who needs water only for household
uses." C. Johnson, The Continuing Voids in Texas Groundwater Law: Are Concepts and Terminology
to Blame?, 17 St. Mary's L.J. 1281, 1282-82 (1986).
As it rejected the English Rule after over 130 years of use, the Ohio Supreme Court similarly
noted the vulnerability of the small operator under that Rule. The court found that the English Rule
assured that the landowner who obtains the water is merely the one who is able to drill the deepest
or biggest well. Cline v. American Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324, 326 (1984), cited in Note,
A Modern Approach to Groundwater Allocation Disputes: Cline v.American Aggregates Corporation,
7 Journal of Energy L. & Pol'y 361, 370 (1986).
51. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Ch.41, § 857, topic 4, at 256 (1979).
52. Control over water rights has generally been a concern of state, not federal, law. However,
federal law will take precedence in cases where water flows, is pumped or trucked across state lines
and state law attempts to block its movement, so interfering with interstate commerce. City of Altus
v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 837 (W.D. Tex. 1966). Federal courts have also carved out niches of
preclusion for water quality, Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir.
1985); endangered species, Cappaert v. U.S.., 426 U.S. 128 (1976); navigation, U.S. v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 709 (1899); hydropower, U.S. v. Appalachian Elec. Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377, 419-20 (1940); and reclamation of dry lands, California v. U.S., 438 U.S. 645,
653 (1978). For a good discussion of the interplay of federal and Texas state water law, see D.
Frownfelter, The International Component of Texas Water Law, 18 St. Mary's L.J. 481 (1986).
Arguments could be made that groundwater rights should come within federal jurisdiction. For
example, many aquifers, such as the Ogallala, underlie several states. Texas state laws which allow
waste of groundwater pumped from the Ogallala may interfere with use by out-of-state pumpers,
hence unduly burdening interstate commerce. Second, overpumpage can threaten aquifers with
salinization and migration of toxic chemicals, and so might come within the federal realm for water
quality. Last, groundwater supports much of the agriculture in dry areas of Texas and so might come
within the reclamation category of federal jurisdiction. If Texas state courts are reluctant to give up
the absolute ownership doctrine, perhaps a case could be brought in federal court requesting some
sort of intercession.
53. C. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 75 n.13 (1985).
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The English rule was first adopted by Texas courts in the 1904 decision
of Houston & T.C. Railway Co. v. East.5 4 The court there considered a
claim for damages to a preexisting homestead well that had been drained
by a second and much larger well supplying railroad locomotives and
machine shops. In its opinion, the court declared that "the person who
owns the surface may dig therein and apply all that is there found to his
own purposes, at his free will and pleasure", and dismissed the claim."4.1.1 Groundwater Ownership-Precedent
The Houston court supported its position by indicating the age and
breadth of precedential cases, the persuasive policy arguments, and the
inadequacy of the competing theory of groundwater ownership. In citing
early origins of the rule of absolute ownership, the court acknowledged
the classic British statement in Acton v. Blundell: "immediately below is
his property, whether it is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth,
or part soil, part water. " 6 The Houston court also cited an 1861 American
opinion, Frazierv. Brown, as proof that the rule had early been adopted
in the United States as well. 7 In the Frazier decision, an Ohio court
considered the scope of "ownership of surface waters which, without any
distinct and definite channel, ooze, filter and percolate", and announced
that "the maxim, 'cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos,'
applies to its full extent."" The surface estate owner owns to the bowels
of the earth, including the groundwater.
4.1.2 Groundwater Ownership-Supporting Policy Rationale
The Houston court emphasized that its opinion was not based solely
on principles of staredecisis, but was also supported by policy arguments.
The court mentioned two reasons, one technical, the other economic.
First, rules governing groundwater would be "hopelessly uncertain" and
"practically impossible" due to the poor understanding of groundwater's
"existence, origin, movement, and course."' 9 And second, abandonment
of absolute ownership would "interfere, to the material detriment of the
commonwealth, with drainage and agriculture, mining, the construction
of highways and railroads, with sanitary regulations, building, and the
general progress of improvement in works of embellishment and utility.
54. 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
55. Id.
56. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Ex. 1843).

57. 81 s.w. at 280.
58. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 304 (1861).
59. 81 S.W. at 281.
60. Id.
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4.1.3 Groundwater Ownership-Rejection of Alternate Theory
Finally, the Houston court dismissed the other major ownership theory:
"in the absence of express contract and a positive authorized legislation
I ..the law recognizes no correlative rights in respect to underground
waters percolating, oozing, or filtrating through the earth."'" The correlative rights doctrine, also known as the reasonable use or American
rule, limits groundwater ownership rights of an overlying user to "his
proportionate share of the total amount available based upon .. .his
current reasonable and beneficial need for water." 62 The Houston court
made clear that this approach would not apply in Texas.
4.1.4 Groundwater Ownership-Current Law
The Houston case continues to be good law. The Texas Supreme Court
directly reaffirmed Houston and the absolute ownership doctrine as recently as 1983.63 A Texas Court of Appeals again endorsed Houston in
May 1989 .M"65 With such strong and current endorsement of his right to
all the groundwater he can pump, a well owner wants for very little and
has little incentive to bargain with others.
4.2 Texas Rules of Liability for Groundwater Use
A well operator's absolute ownership of pumped groundwater, "for
use at his free will and pleasure", implies that a resulting "inconvenience
to his neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque injuria,
which cannot become the ground of an action."' In fact, Texas rules of
groundwater ownership do tend to immunize users from a number of
types of liability. The argument of absolute ownership has been used to
bar claims for well drawdown, baseflow reduction, land surface subsidence, and, perhaps most tellingly, waste. Also, capture-based ownership
has been used to interfere with legal methods of recovery, blocking nuisance suits, barring most suits under negligence theories, and imposing
61. Id. at 280.
62. F. Trelease, G. Gould, Cases and Materials on Water Law 427 (West Publishing 1986).

The correlative rights theory is sometimes linked closely or confused with the reasonable use
doctrine. Accurately speaking, they are not the same. The correlative rights theory limits pro rata
shares to an amount which will not harm sharing users. By contrast, the reasonable use doctrine
allows a landowner to take his full pro rata share, despite harm to another sharing user, if he can
show that the water was drawn for a beneficial purpose. J.Castleberry, Jr., A Proposal for Adoption
of a Legal Doctrine of Ground-Stream Water Interrelationship in Texas, 7 St. Mary's L.J. 503, 50708 (1975).

63. City of Sherman v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983).
64. Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1989).
65. The Texas Legislature has continued to approve and defer to this court-created system of
ownership. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 52.002 (Vernon 1990).
66. 81 S.W. at 280.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[VoL, 32

stiff presumptions which make proof quite difficult. In turn, such a large
degree of immunity leaves pumpers with little to fear and little compulsion
to enter or comply with agreements.
4.2.1 Groundwater Liability-Drawdown
Texas courts do not recognize claims for aquifer drawdown. In its
Houston decision, the Texas Supreme Court rejected such a claim, although the plaintiff had presented a strong case. 67 The court conceded
that the drawdown was due to the defendant's pumpage, and found that
the water in the plaintiff's well was entirely drained, not just lowered.
Causation and damage seemed clearly proven. Still, the court found that
there was no cause of action.
4.2.2 Groundwater Liability--Surfacewater Flow Reductions
Texas courts generally do not recognize claims against pumpage that
decreases surface flows. A Court of Civil Appeals in El Paso considered
a case in which well withdrawals caused Commanche Springs to be
"materially reduced in flow and at times completely dried up." 6 The
court refused to enjoin or fine the pumpers, holding that ownership of
the Springs only obtained "at and after their emergence from the ground"
and did not extend to rights to exclude others from water before it emerged.'
4.2.3 Groundwater Liability-Land Subsidence
In Friendswood Devel. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., a Texas court rejected a claim for pumpage-related subsidence.7" The claim was brought
by a number of landowners along the coast of Galveston Bay, charging
that Exxon and Friendswood Development pumped large amounts of
groundwater and caused the plaintiffs' land to sink, in many cases, to
drop below sea level. They alleged that the defendants pumped excessive
amounts from wells too tightly packed and too close to common boundaries. Furthermore, they claimed that the defendants had prior knowledge
from engineering studies that indicated the pumpage would cause subsidence and inundation. Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court rejected
the plaintiffs' claim. The court characterized the damages as "suffered
without the invasion of legal right or the violation of a legal duty." 7

67. Id.
68. Pecos County Water Control and Imp. Dist. v. Williams, 271 SW.2d 503, 505 (Tex. Civ.
App.-EI Paso 1954).

69. Id.
70. Friendswood Devel. v. Smith-Southwest Indus, 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978).
71. Id. at 28.
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4.2.4 Groundwater Liability-Nuisance
Nuisance has been described as substantial and unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of land.2 The Houston court is not
hospitable to the theory: stating that "no action lies against the owner
for interfering with or destroying percolating or circulating water under
the earth's surface." 7 3 Restrictions on groundwater availability would
presumably interfere with uses such as irrigation and agriculture, cooling
and industry, and municipal supply and residential development. However, in Texas, interference of this kind appears to be per se insubstantial,
reasonable and no grounds for a nuisance suit.74
4.2.5 Groundwater Liability-Negligence
In Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., the Supreme Court of Texas wrote "the
law imposes [a duty] upon all persons to use due care in the use of their
property or the conduct of their business to avoid injury to others."" The
FriendswoodDevelopment court endorsed this negligence theory of recovery and announced that it would apply in future subsidence cases.
However, the FriendswoodDevelopment court refused to apply it in
the case then at bar due to concerns about reliance in property cases."
Also, the argument has not appeared in any subsequent cases. It is possible
that the argument requires proof of such high levels of negligence or
foreseeability that it simply has not been used. In addition, the negligence
theory was expressly restricted to subsidence, and only that occurring
after 1978. So, the argument cannot be used to press claims for previous
subsidence, nor for drawdown, mining or other groundwater related damages during any period.7 7
72. W. Page Keeton et at., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 86, 88 (5th ed. 1984).
73. 81 S.W. at 281, citing with approval Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 91 Am. Dec. 72 (1866).
74. The dissent in Friendswood unsuccessfully argued for courts to use a nuisance analysis,
weighing the severity of the harm caused against the utility of the water use. 576 S.W.2d at 35;
Note, Sinking Fortunes: Texas Remedies for Victims of Land Subsidence, 20 Nat. Res.J. 375, 386
(April 1980).
75. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tex. 1936).
76, 576 S.W.2d at 30.
77. "The addition of negligence as a ground of recovery shall apply only to future subsidence
proximately caused by future withdrawals of ground water from wells which are either produced or
drilled in a negligent manner after the date this opinion becomes final." Id.
The rejection of negligence as a basis for recovering for most types of abusive groundwater
withdrawals is particularly odd when one considers that Texas law recognizes negligence in oil and
gas pumpage. While petroleum is held under an identical theory of absolute ownership, the Texas
Supreme Court has still been willing to state, "under the common law, and independent of the
conservation statutes, the respondents were legally bound to use due care to avoid the negligent
waste or destruction of the minerals imbedded in petitioners' oil and gas-bearing strata." Elliff v.
Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1948). It is difficult to explain away the inconsistency
between the treatment of groundwater and oil and gas. Perhaps the lower value of groundwater
simply does not merit courts' involvement in settling negligence-based disputes.
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4.2.6 Groundwater Liability-Waste
Texas courts have long condemned waste of groundwater. In its 1904
Houston decision, the Supreme Court of Texas suggested that it might
honor claims against wasteful groundwater use.7" A 1948 state appeals
court ruling condemned groundwater storage in "an earthen tank which
leaks badly", noting that "waste of natural resources is against the public
policy of this State." 79 In 1978, the Supreme Court of Texas expressly
granted the right to recovery "if the landowner's manner of withdrawing
ground water from his land . . . is willfully wasteful.""0
And yet, when faced with a quite convincing case of waste, the Texas
Supreme Court backed down and removed an injunction against the allegedly wasteful use.8 In that case, City of Corpus Christi v. City of
Pleasanton, Corpus Christi had drilled a set of wells whose production
was discharged into the Nueces River to flow 118 miles to Lake Corpus
Christi, where it was used for water supply and recreation. En route, an
estimated 63 to 74 percent of the wellwater was lost to evaporation,
transpiration, and seepage. 2
The Corpus Christi court recognized the right to use or sell water for
any legal purpose off premises, as well as the right to transport the water
to its use site by any of various means, including by "river, creek, ...
bayou, . . . sewer, street, road. "1" The court announced that the "percentage of the escape through evaporation, seepage, et cetera is wholly
' Much as in the court's attitude toward negligence,
immaterial." 85
the
court appeared to accept the theory of waste but reject its application.
4.2.7 Groundwater Liabilitym-Presumptions and Proof
One of the peculiarities of Texas water law is that groundwater is held
under the absolute ownership doctrine, while surface water rights are
governed by the correlative use theory.s" Groundwater underlying a land
parcel is held outright by the private owner of the surface estate and is
subject to use as he sees fit. On the other hand, surface waters running
78. The Court quoted a Minnesota court injunction with approval. The injunction was imposed
against a defendant who "made no use whatever of the water, but for no useful purpose, drained it
away, and discharged it through the sewers of a town." 81 S.W. at 281.
79. Cantwell v. Zinser, 208 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1948).
80, 576 S.W.2d at 30. See 56 Am.Jur. Torts § 119, at 602 (1947).
81. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S,W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955).
82. Id. at 800.
83. 771 S.W.2d at 236.
84. 276 S.W.2d at 802.
85. Id. at 803.
86. In re the Adjudication of the Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the Guadalupe
River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 445 (Tex. 1982).
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past or over his land are kept in trust by the state and allocated by seniority
and riparian status under a permit system."
The distinction is particularly relevant because some water that lies
underground may be treated as surface water within the control of the
state. Precisely, "water flowing in an underground stream. . . [or] springs
which form the source of a flowing stream or which add perceptibly to
the flow of water in a stream" are considered to be "non-percolating
water" and hence subject to the authority of the state.88
However, in absence of contrary evidence, underground waters are
presumed to be percolating and thus governed by absolute ownership
rules. 9 This presumption puts a heavy burden on the plaintiff to sufficiently show a connection between underground and surface waters. While
the hydrologic cycle, the flow of streams to aquifers and oceans to rain
and back, may seem to be common knowledge, Texas courts refuse to
take judicial notice or to require only superficial proof.
In Pecos County Water Control & Imp. Dist. v. Williams, the burden
of proof was a great deal higher. The Supreme Court of Texas required
the plaintiff, owner of surface rights to Commanche Springs, to "state
sufficient facts to identify the claimed well defined [underground] channel,
either as to surface indications, probable route, source or destination."'
The court added that the "mere fact that the wells of one man dried up
springs or the wells of another, neither proves nor indicates a well defined
channel of underground water.9
The burden of proof is further increased by the nature of the remedy
sought. Typically, a plaintiff will seek an injunction to stop the abusive
pumping. The Pecos County court warned, however, that "the petition
in an injunction suit must negative every other reasonable hypothesis
except this one advanced by plaintiff." 92 Coupled with the burden of
persuasion and production that a plaintiff normally carries, the additional
weight of first overcoming the presumption that groundwater is perco87. "The waters are in trust for the public: first, for navigation purposes, which concerns all the
public and is ordinarily regarded as a superior right; second, the riparian waters of the stream are
held in trust by the state for the riparian owners along its margins; third, the nonriparian waters in
the stream are held by the state in trust, to be controlled and disposed of by the state for the best
interests of all the people; fourth, the waters are in trust for uses and benefits not here involved."
Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458, 468 (Tex. 1926).
88. Bartley v. Sone, 527 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1975).
89. Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (Tex. 1927).
90. Pecos County Water Control & Imp. Dist. v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1954).
91. Id.at 507.
92. The court conceded that the plaintiff in Pecos County proved that Commanche Springs had
flowed for at least the previous 90 years and had been used continually during that time for irrigation
and domestic use until the District sunk its wells. After the wells began operation, the springs went
dry. For lack of proof, the Pecos County court refused to enjoin pumpage by the Water District. ld.
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lating, and then satisfying the prerequisites for an injunction, can stymie
quite valid claims.
5. TEXAS STATUTORY LAW ON GROUNDWATER
Much like common law in the state, Texas legislation has failed to
support or substitute for private agreements against excessive groundwater
use and related environmental problems. The state Legislature has been
willing to yield, defer and delegate in the groundwater area. Although a
will to cooperate and trust is usually commendable in politics, such
delegation may not work in this case. The Legislature appears to have
given authority to institutions and groups which are largely not willing
or empowered to accept responsibility for the problem. The discussion
below treats statutes which exclude the Legislature and agencies from
involvement, which defer to judicial control, and which delegate to local
districts.
5.1 Groundwater Statutes-State Legislative Abdication
In terms of ownership, policy, and regulation, the state has expressly
given up interest and control. In 11.021(a) of the Texas Water Code, the
Legislature describes the waters of the state at length and nowhere men-.
tions percolating waters:
"the water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing
river, natural stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the Gulf
of Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every
river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in
the state is the property of the state.""
Considering the difficulties and disagreements which face private owners
of a right to exploit a common resource, this omission and effective
cession may be a mistake.
While a series of technical studies commissioned by the state and
federal governments has recognized problems related to groundwater use,
the Legislature has failed to respond with a general, state-wide policy
" Also, the Legislature has failed to
concerning aquifer protection. 49 "95 697
93. Texas Water Code Ann. § 11.021(a) (Vernon Supp, 1990). Please note that, strictly speaking,

the state does not own waters of the state, but rather holds them in trust for the public. See 642
S.W.2d at 445 and 286 S.W. at 468.
94. "The legislature recognizes that certain areas of the state are experiencing and will experience
in the future critical underground water problems...." Tex. Water Code Ann, 52.051 (Vernon
Supp. 1990).
95. Moody, et al., supra note 2; Library of Congress, supra note 3.
96. Gabrysch, supra note 5; Mackey, supra note 8; Reeves & Ozuna, supra note 14; Nalley &
Rettman, supra note 16.
97. Johnson. supra note 50, at 1284.

Sprngi192}

TEXAS GROUNDWATER

LAW

set more specific guidelines on aquifer lifetimes, use priorities, conservation devices, well spacing calculations, and other aquifer management
methods. 98
The state has also stripped itself of authority to directly regulate groundwater. Section 11 of the Texas Water Code concerns authority for regulation of water rights in the state. The Section begins, however, with
the proviso, "nothing in this code affects vested private rights to the use
of water. "99 Since surface waters are considered state rights granted by
permit to individuals, the "private rights" excluded from the Code refer
only to percolating groundwater.
The state has also expressly surrendered the means to directly manage
groundwater. Section 52 of the Water Code outlines the administrative
institutions and procedures for administering water use in the state. It
too, however, exempts groundwater from the extensive regulation common to surface water. Section 52.003 states, "the laws and administrative
rules relating to the use of surface water do not apply to underground
water. " "
The discussion below in sections 5.2 and 5.3 suggests that the abandonment of state responsibility for setting policy and writing regulations
may not be the most successful approach to groundwater problems. The
other parts of government involved in groundwater management, the state
agencies, courts, and the Districts, seem either unwilling or unable to
substitute for the Legislature.
5.2 Groundwater Statutes-State Legislative Deference
In Texas, the state Legislature came late to addressing groundwater
rights and uses. By 1904, the Supreme Court of Texas had already decided
Houston, and had pronounced absolute ownership as the controlling doctrine. 0 ' The Legislature did not become involved until after serious droughts
occurred in 1910 and 1917. 02' Its principal efforts consisted of passage
of a Conservation Amendment and a law requiring plugging and capping
of flowing artesian wells.' Stung perhaps by the court's 1921 rejection
of a surface water regulation scheme, the Legislature went no further
with direct regulation than the rather exhortatory Amendment and the
limited statute."04
98. Texas Water Code Ann. § 52 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
99. Texas Water Code Ann. § 1).001(a) (Vernon 1988).
100. Texas Water Code Ann. § 52.003 (Vernon Supp. 1990). A recent Texas attorney general's
opinion (Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-54 (1991) appears to broaden the legislature's ability to
delegate administrative rulemaking authority in the groundwater area.
101. 81 S.W. 279 (1904).
102. In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the Guadalupe
River Basin, 642 S.W.2d at 440 (Tex. 1982).
103. Tex. Const. art XVI, § 59; Tex. Water Code Ann. § 11.021-.207 (Vernon 1988).
104. The Court's rejection of the legislature's early regulatory attempts is found in the case Board
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Instead, the Legislature codified court-made law. According to Section
52.002 of the Water Code,
"[tihe ownership and rights of the owner of the land and his lessees
and assigns in underground water are hereby recognized, and nothing
in this code shall be construed as depriving or divesting the owner
or his lessees and assigns of the ownership or rights."""s
Yet, the courts have not seemed to welcome this deference. In Houston,
the Supreme Court of Texas quotes its principal precedential case, Frazier
v. Brown, as requiring the absolute ownership rule only "in the absence
of express contract and a positive authorized legislation.""° More than
70 years later, the same court prefaced its analysis of the Friendswood
Development case by noting, "regulation of ground water production is
primarily a legislative, not a judicial problem."7
Courts resist involvement in groundwater disputes for good reason.
First, the Texas Supreme Court has worried that the potential number of
suits could clog the courts.0 8 Second, the courts have been concerned
that the ad hoc nature of adjudication could result in equal protection
problems due to variations from case to case." Third, judges seem to
fear that the complexity and technical nature of groundwater disputes are
beyond their expertise. '0Other plausible reasons for faulting judicial
control include the awkwardness of joining all affected parties before a
of Water Engineers v. McKnight. I II Tex. 82, 229 SW. 301 (Tex. 1921).
In response to an April 15, 1992 declaration by the Texas Water Commission that the southern
Edwards Aquifer was an underground river and thus subject to Commission regulatory authority,
one state representative lamented the Legislature's continued inability to be equally aggressive in
regulating groundwater. State Representative Libby Linebarger, a Democrat from Manchaca, Texas,
said, "Our repeated efforts have always resulted in gridlock. The move by the Water Commission
was taken only as a last resort." D. Graves, Commission's Act to Redefine Aquifer Called Courageous,
Austin Amer.-States., Apr. 22, 1992 at BI, B5.
It should be noted that the Commission's attempt to regulate the aquifer is at best limited and at
worst, stillborn. Upon announcing his agency's bid to regulate Texas groundwater, Chairman John
Hall of the Texas Water Commission said, "It is not our goal to regulate groundwater on a statewide
basis. Our goal is effective management of the Edwards." Furthermore, the chairman conceded,
"we do anticipate that what we have done today will be challenged in court, anticipating one
opponent's view (State Senator Bill Simms, chairman of the Senates Natural Resources Committee):
"it is inconceivable that a state agency has the right to overrule well-established property rights
without judicial or legislative authorization." D. Matustik, Water Commission Takes Control of
Aquifer, Austin Amer.-States., Apr. 16, 1992, at Al, AI5.
105. Tex. Water Code Ann. §52.002 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
106. Houston & T.C. Railway Co. v. East, 81 S.W. at 280 (Tex. 1904); Frazier v. Brown, 12
Ohio St. at 304 (1861).
107. 576 S.W.2d at 26 (Tex. 1978).
108. "lOlur courts are not equipped to regulate ground water uses and subsidence on a suit-bysuit basis." Id at 30.
109. Beckendorff v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Sub. Dist., 558 S.W.2d 75, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston 1977).
110. 81 S.W. at 281; 576 S.W.2d at 29.
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suit and the need for continuing management after the suit."' With these
objections in mind, it may not be best for the Legislature to so willingly
cede power and responsibility for groundwater to the courts.
5.3 Groundwater Statutes-State Legislative Delegation
The Legislature has placed the chief political responsibility for regulating groundwater withdrawals on local Underground Water Conservation Districts. 2 The Districts have been granted authority to control wellspacing, reduce wasteful uses, recharge aquifers, and pursue research,
monitoring and education." 3
Many of the districts have not been potent. Their main shortcomings
include limited research and monitoring resources for calculating optimum
pumping strategies, minimal state guidelines for regulatory approaches,
and limited territory. The size of District territory is probably the most
critical problem. Most Districts consist of a single county, far smaller
than most aquifers.' "' Hence, many of the impacts on a District's groundwater are beyond its jurisdiction and control. "5 Moreover, it is burdensome to enlarge a District, since it requires a majority vote of both the
original District and the annexed area." 6
It is even hard for a District to maintain control within its recognized
boundaries. Extremely large well owners may control jobs or votes and
I1l. J. Teutsch, Controls and Remedies for Ground Water--Caused Land Subsidence, 16 Hous.
L. Rev. 283, 312 (1979).
112. "It is also the purpose of the legislature to. assure that the local areas will determine the
Tex. Water Code Ann. § 52.051
best methods for handling underground water problems ....
(Vernon Supp. 1990). The willingness of the state legislature to divide its authority among local
units of government may be a result of gridlock at the state level. One state legislator, Sen. Gonzales
Barrientos (D-Austin), spoke of the state's impasse over groundwater regulation in the following
way: "The problem is that this is not an issue where there are two sides. It is an issue where there
are at least five sides, and each has enough clout in the legislature to keep any proposal from
passing." Graves, supra note 104, at B5. While local government still holds the bulk of control
over groundwater withdrawal in Texas, recent efforts by the Texas Water Commission to become
involved should be noted. See also notes 100 and 104.
113. Tex. Water Code Ann. §52.117 (Vernon 1988); Tex. Water Code Ann. §52.169 (Vernon
Supp. 1990).
114. In 1978, ten districts had been set up in West Texas alone. 576 S.W.2d at 30. This pattern
of numerous small districts independently trying to control a single shared aquifer appears to be
continuing. A review of 1989 legislation indicated that ten new districts had been proposed for the
State in that year. 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 514, 515, 519, 524, 653, 654, 669, 673, 712, 715. None
included more than one county.
115. A clear example of extrajurisdictional problems would involve interstate or international
aquifers. For instance, a major aquifer such as the Ogallala stretches into Oklahoma, Kansas,
Colorado, and New Mexico while another major reservoir, the Evangeline, reaches into Louisiana
and Mississippi. Teutsch, supra note 48, at 234. Minor shallow Texas aquifers lying beneath rivers
are shared with Mexico, New Mexico, Colorado, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana. Frownfelter,
supra note 52, at 488.
116. Tex. Water Code Ann. §52.052(d,g) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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so hold sway over a small territory, making it difficult for the District
board to restrict their pumpage. Many other well owners may be expressly
exempt from control. For example, pumpers of 25,000 to 100,000 gallons
per day are entitled to an automatic permit. Those withdrawing less than
25,000 gallons per day, or those who are pumping to water livestock or
recover hydrocarbons, may not be permitted or limited in their pumpage
at all." 7 Lastly, and somewhat ironically, the state has retained the right
to exclude its lands from control. 's The state itself seems to lack confidence in the Districts' ability to manage groundwater.
It should be pointed out that some of the Districts have been quite
successful. The Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District has been
particularly effective. "' Reasons for its success include its large size, its
few (though large) pumpers, its ability to fine, and its access to surface
water. Its territory stretches over two counties, and extends to a third
through informal agreements, thus giving the District adequate jurisdiction to manage the underlying aquifers. Local wells are principally owned
just by the City of Houston and a few smaller municipalities, thus limiting
transaction costs and freeloader problems. The ability to fine gives the
District an administratively cheap, but closely calibrated, means of enforcing the law. Access to surface supplies on the San Jacinto and Trinity
Rivers has made up for required reductions in groundwater pumpage,
hence limiting the need to persuade a balky public to change its dissolute
lifestyle or install costly conservation devices.
6. SUMMARY OF GROUNDWATER STATUS QUO
6.1 Environmental and Economic Effects of Groundwater Use
The preceding discussion should show that all is not well with groundwater in Texas. Groundwater use imposes serious impacts on adjoining
landowners and on the environment in general. Drawdown causes increased lift costs and, if a entirely new well needs to be made, may lead
to the cost of redrilling, recasing, installing new submersible pumps, and
relocating above-ground piping and housing. Salinization can cause similar problems if a new well must be sunk. Even if pumpage can be
continued at the old location, operators will face the cost of treatment
methods such as osmosis or distillation. Operators and neighbors may
117. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 52.170(a)(I),(a)(3,4),(d),(h) (Vernon Supp. 1990). Average flow
per well was 2400 gallons per day in 1987, exempting most wells. Allfred, supra note 37.
118. Tex. Water Code Ann. 52.065 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
119. Depth to water measurements in Pasadena, Baytown, and near the Johnson Space Center
rebounded by about 20 feet during 1973-77, and rates of subsidence in those areas have slowed due
to pumpage controls. Gabrysch, supra note 5, at 66. Also, it appears that the High Plains Underground
Water Control District has been effective (see note 41).
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also encounter subsidence impacts, such as flooding due to coastal inundation and watershed slope changes. 2 If pumpers are not discouraged
and the aquifer is mined until effectively depleted, well owners will
confront costs related to conversion to surface water sources, such as
construction of dams, canals, piping and purification systems. Alternatively, miners may face major economic changes, such as abandonment
of water-intensive crops and practices. Reduction in surface baseflows
may even foreclose use of surface water sources after groundwater supplies are exhausted.
6.2 Failure of Norms to Cure Groundwater Problems
While many agree as to the harmful effects of groundwater use, voluntary practices and agreements do not seem to be an adequate response.
As mentioned above, a number of reasons may limit the success of norms.
Ignorance about the physical principles underlying groundwater behavior,
or about the specific characteristics of a particular groundwater source
may blind an individual to the need for or value of an agreement. Even
if negotiations toward an agreement are initiated, transaction costs of
monitoring, modeling, and allocating rights to an aquifer may be seen
as prohibitive. Provided that an agreement is signed, one's own compliance may be hindered by a Prisoner's Dilemma, made especially hard
when the difference between the benefits of cooperation and defection
appears to be slight in the short, immediate term. The feebleness of selfhelp may also bar forcing another's compliance, as well. Compliance
becomes doubly difficult when the competition of outsiders to the agreement is considered, as exemplified by the Tragedy of the Commons and
by the racing paradigm. Finally, although pumpers may admit difficulties
with groundwater use and agreements, they likely see no ready escape
from reliance on groundwater. Demand reduction through conservation
practices and devices, aquifer restoration through injection and infiltration, and development of surface water sources each have drawbacks
which may be fatal in the pumpers' view.
6.3 Failure of Common Law to Treat Groundwater Problems
As outlined above, the courts have not been successful in offering
adequate solutions to groundwater disputes due to reigning conceptions
120. A 1975 study estimated that annual costs related to subsidence in a 945 square mile region
in Houston amounted to $31.7 million. If these external costs were added to the 6¢ per 1,000 gallon
internal cost of groundwater, the true economic cost would rise to 25¢ per 1,000 gallons. L. Jones,
J. Larson, Economic Effects ofLand Subsidence due to Excessive Groundwater Withdrawal in the
Texas Gulf Coast Area 4 (Texas Water Resources Institute, Technical Report 67, Texas A&M
University 1975).
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of ownership and liability. The doctrine of absolute ownership allows full
use of underlying water, so long as there is not overwhelming evidence
of waste or malice. This rule of ownership simply does not admit of some
types of harm, including drawdown, surface water flow reductions, and
non-negligent subsidence. Absolute ownership also effectively precludes
most kinds of remedy besides self-help. For instance, the theory of nuisance has been outright rejected, while other means of recovery, such as
negligence and waste have been closely limited by heavy burdens of
proof. No Texas ruling discusses or awards a remedy for a malice-related
pumpage claim.
6.4 Failure of Statutory Law to Resolve Groundwater Problems
Despite the severity of the groundwater problem, and the minimal
answer of norms or case law, the Legislature has not offered strong
solutions. Statutes have relinquished state groundwater ownership, general policy-making interest, and direct regulatory authority. Legislation
has typically deferred to court-made law, though courts have expressly
stated their reluctance to become involved in such disputes. Where statutory authority has been preserved, it has been placed with Underground
Water Conservation Districts. Unfortunately, the Districts' powers have
been critically limited by shortfalls in funding for monitoring and enforcement, restrictions on territory, and exemptions for wells of varying
sizes and uses.
7. CONCLUSIONS ON TEXAS GROUNDWATER LAW
This analysis suggests that there are serious problems related to groundwater use in Texas, including drawdown, mining, salination, baseflow
reduction, and subsidence. Private, voluntary practices and agreements
have been unsuccessful due to problems with ignorance, transaction costs,
prisoner dilemmas, self-help measures, commons effects, racing, and
limited supply and use options. Also, agreements have had little backing
from the judiciary. due to its use of the absolute ownership doctrine and
liability immunity. Legislative programs have been ineffective in setting
standards that might support or act as proxies for such agreements, on
account of limits to District authority and territory.
8. LESSONS LEARNED ON RIGHTS, MARKETS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
The law and problems relevant to Texas groundwater are distinctive,
but not unique: there may be a moral to the story that we can apply in
other situations. As one of the very few natural resource systems in the
nation which has long been effectively unregulated by any central, public
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agency, Texas groundwater and its governing law should offer a good
model or warning as the country moves to more private sector-oriented,
market-based environmental regulation.
The amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1990 provide the clearest and
most fully formed example of a market-based federal system of pollution
control. In analyzing the effectiveness of market approaches such as that
offered in the Clean Air Act, the experience with Texas groundwater may
help frame the questions and assess the answers.
For instance, will the award of rights for pollution emissions, rather
than for clean air, inhibit the market function, considering the transaction
costs and difficulty of self-help that have plagued victims of groundwater
damage? Second, will all those fouling or taking from the commons be
included in rights-trading: for example, will car users or manufacturers
remain outside the market, much as many pumpers have managed to
avoid responsibility for their effects on shared aquifers? Third, will pollution rights be correctly valued to reflect all externalities, or will crossmedia, inter-system effects be underpriced: for instance, will sulfur dioxide rights be priced to fully include acid rain costs, unlike Texas groundwater rights' exclusion of surface water baseflow effects? Fourth, will
pollution rights actually be bought by victims or rivals of the polluters,
unlike in Texas, where victims of groundwater harm have been unwilling
to invest in making their neighbors' use of groundwater more efficient
and less harmful? And, finally, in amending or adding rules regarding
these rights, how courageous can we expect political agencies to be,
whether they are representative, like the Congress, or more insulated like
the EPA or judiciary, in view of the Texas Legislature's and state courts'
reluctance to intervene in Texas groundwater ownership and liability
disputes?
Many of these questions regarding the Clean Air Act will not be answered until complete regulations are issued, interpreted and enforced.
Nor, of course, is the Clean Air Act the exclusive form which marketbased environmental regulation might take. And, it is also unclear to
what extent the difficulties of Texas groundwater exactly translate to the
problems of air quality or other natural resources. However, this writer
would strongly suggest that the Texas experience with absolute rights to
groundwater can provide valid questions to ask of market-based environmental protection.

